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A PURCHASE on 
CORRUPTION
The Fitzgerald Inquiry has been great theatre. It has 
also been hailed as proof that Queensland's own 
peculiar political system is capable of ref orming it­
self. John Wanna is not convinced. Even a change of 
government, he argues, won't alter much.
At its height, Queensland’s Fitzgerald Inquiry.rivalled a carefully staged series of 
show trials. Brisbane audiences 
queued for hours to secure seats; a 
"who’s who" of Queensland ap­
peared in the witness stand; a bevy 
of coy prostitutes ran the kerbside 
gauntlet; and an insatiable mob of 
local and interstate media was agog 
with the daily theatre. Queensland 
and, for much of the time, Australia 
was hooked on the sheer entertain­
ment value of the inquiry. An un­
ravelling plot of crime, sex and 
power made it irresistible.
Public hearings finally ended in 
February 1989 after extensive and 
vigorous investigations by Commis­
sioner Fitzgerald and his staff of over 
a hundred. The final report will be 
delivered on July 3. The impact of the 
inquiry hearings has led many politi­
cal commentators to suggest that, after 
years of abuse, neglect and corrup­
tion, the political system was indeed 
capable of becoming responsible and 
accountable. The very existence of 
such a far-reaching inquiry gradually 
became construed as evidence that the 
system of checks and balances to
power was operational and effective. 
Government could be monitored 
through existing institutions, and thus 
did not require substantial change. In 
short, democracy was safe and robust. 
Accountability existed and, indeed, 
triumphed even if its renewal from the 
ashes had been seriously doubted for 
decades.
This apologetic media account 
shaped the terms in which the inquiry 
was represented in the public domain. 
Queensland politics became fuelled 
by a polemical but inconclusive 
public brawl over corruption and ac­
countability. Much of this "debate" 
has taken the form of alleged charges 
and counter-charges, unctuous as­
surances, and political party breast- 
beating. More importantly, the public 
debate remained at the rhetorical 
level, with very few substantive 
proposals emerging or being imple­
mented. Many promises were made; 
but actual reforms to the political sys­
tem were much less forthcoming.
During 1988-89 the three main 
political parties each assumed a 
holier-than-thou approach while en­
gaging in a major public crusade 
against corruption. All political par­
ties promised to deliver a new in­
tegrity in government while maintain­
ing a suitable reticence over the details 
of specific action against corruption. 
Corruption was taken up as an election 
issue worth running a campaign on, 
but considered to have little resonance 
and little pay-off for those elected to 
govern. Thus, the three main party 
candidates for the state by-election in 
disgraced minister Don Lane’s old 
seat of Merthyr each declared corrup­
tion the main political issue facing 
Queensland. Yettheirrespective party 
organisations remained far more cir­
cumspect. Prospective or incumbent 
governments had much to lose from 
continued attention to corruption. The 
immediate political risks of particular 
action or proposals were high.
As a result of the Fitzgerald inves­
tigations, the political issue of corrup­
tion became prominent news in 
Queensland, capturing the public con­
sciousness. The abuse of public office 
whether by politicians, senior public 
servants or police officers became a 
m ajor talking point for many 
Queenslanders. Yet, almost ironical­
ly, the outcome of such raised-con- 
sciousness was not sustained outrage
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Russ Hinze, former Minister for Everything, now sans everything.
or mass disillusionment. Rather, of 
more immediate concern to those 
living under Queensland’s illiberal 
and frequendy uninformed political 
culture was a rare chance to be on the 
inside, in the "know", to exercise 
speculation, and perhaps to believe 
what they, of course, had suspected all 
along.
Increased public awareness of cor­
ruption brought with it some social ac­
ceptance often premised on simplistic 
theories about "rotten apples" in the 
police and parliament Such views al­
lowed usually puritanical but phleg­
matic Queenslanders to maintain the 
pretence of their own moral rectitude. 
Despite the many allegations of cor­
ruption and ptrhaps because of the un­
ceasing public exposure of them, 
some Queenslanders adopted a self- 
righteousness typical of insular and 
hypocritical political cultures. This 
sanctimonious attitude was nowhere 
more apparent than in the new con­
tours of conservative politics in the 
post-Bjelke-Petersen era.
Living in the city seat of a "bush" 
government, Brisbane residents 
believed the hearsay evidence 
presented to the commission of in­
quiry. After all, most Brisbanites had, 
at some time, driven past the seedy 
brothels in the traffic-congested For­
titude Valley. Many felt relieved that 
what they had "known" for years was 
finally coming out into the open. Most 
local residents retained their own 
anecdotal and sometimes apocryphal 
stories of police corruption, brothel 
torchings, and apparent extravagance 
from ill-gotten gains. The media rep­
resentation of the inquiry allowed 
them to make sense of the fragments 
of their own knowledge, especially as 
Commissioner Fitzgerald acknow­
ledged that he had uncovered merely 
the "tip of the iceberg". Living uneasi­
ly under a majority rural government 
rife with cronyism, Brisbane conser­
vatives also reflected that government 
was, by nature, a corrupting process; 
too readily so when one party held of­
fice alone, and for so long.
Without diminishing the public at­
tention given to corruption, the 
media’s presentation of the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry generated a gradual indif­
ference to the issues as the proceed­
ings continued. This may be largely 
unavoidable with any long-term 
political issue. A few notable per­
sonalities were targetted for their mis­
conduct and hounded from public 
office, as was the self-confessed cor­
rupt ex-Transport Minister Don Lane. 
But, apart from this reaction, a 
resigned complacency emerged about 
the need for real changes in the sys­
tem. This complacency was raised to 
an art form by the succeeding Ahem 
administration, which denied any ac­
countability for previous malad­
ministration - despite maintaining a 
ministry substantially similar to that of 
its predecessor.
Complacency was also evident 
from a further two sources of public 
perception. There were many who 
considered that corruption arose from 
the personal failings and lack of in­
tegrity of particular figures in public 
office. Others contended that the ex­
isting political system was impervious 
to change or unlikely to adopt serious 
reform. Therefore inquiries, extensive 
publicity and scandals were routine 
occurrences but unlikely to produce 
any significant changes.
A further downstream effect of the 
media coverage of the inquiry may be
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attributed to the emphasis placed on 
the roles and awaited fates of impli­
cated personalities. Given increased 
public awareness of corruption, ex­
pectations of "heads rolling” were 
raised. By highlighting the spec­
tacular, media accounts encouraged 
the view that extensive dismissals and 
criminal proceedings against many of 
those allegedly involved would result 
from the inquiry hearings. This per­
ception later became a pressing politi­
cal problem for the governing 
Nationals, as many of the "heads” 
were their own supporters or appoin­
tees.
In 1987-88 the inquiry produced 
important, though limited, political 
fallout As in Japan where leaders ac­
cused of corruption are often replaced 
to preserve the networks of influence, 
Queertsland saw a spectacular politi­
cal "coup" surrounding the challenge 
for the premiership by Mike Ahem. 
The immediate impact of acknow­
ledged corruption was exploited by 
those in cabinet seeking to oust the 
aged Premier. After the resignation of 
Bjelke-Petersen in December 1987, 
his safe rural seat of Barambah was in­
itially lost to the far-right Citizens’ 
Electoral Lobby. The "Minister for 
Everything" Russ Hinze resigned in 
mid-1988 under pressure from the 
new Premier and the ensuing Gold 
Coast by-election produced a twenty 
percent swing against the govern­
ment. Then, in 1989, the former 
Transport M inister Don Lane 
resigned after admitting to fraud, elec­
toral infringements and abuse of 
public office. The Police Commis­
sioner was stood down for over a 
year before being relieved of his com­
mission by parliament. Various other 
serving police officers were given in­
demnities or were implicated in hear­
say evidence. But the overall political 
toll was relatively slight given the sig­
nificance of the allegations and the 
amount of evidence uncovered by the 
Ftizgerald Inquiry.
The Royal Commission may well 
have missed the opportunity of most 
political impact by being unable to 
deliver its final report until July. But
this delay made it clearer that the num­
ber of public officers likely to be 
charged was relatively small, and the 
number likely to be convicted even 
smaller. It became increasingly evi­
dent that those accused of corruption 
during the investigative process, but 
pleading not guilty, would escape trial 
on charges of corruption. One reason 
for this was that often the type of 
evidence given at the inquiry was 
presented in a legally ambiguous 
manner that provided insufficient 
grounds on which to secure convic­
tions. Much of the "evidence" offered 
to the inquiry was hearsay evidence, 
often unsubstantiated and uncor­
roborated, with many ques­
tions rem aining to be 
answered. It was also dif­
ficu lt to charge major 
figures who had left their 
public duty and whose 
recollections of previous 
events were hazy. Self-in­
crimination remained the 
principal means by which 
corrupt public officers were 
rooted out. Given that most 
officers did this under in­
demnity from prosecution, 
few could be expected to be 
brought to justice.
Indeed, charges for per­
jury, contempt of court and 
increasingly for tax evasion 
(a la A1 Capone) became the 
favoured means of proceed­
ing against alleged con­
spirators. Moreover, while 
many prominent names 
were mentioned to the in­
quiry, few political figures 
or crime bosses were caught 
in the investigative net This 
appears somewhat contrary 
to intuition, given that the 
enduring nature of the net­
works of corruption seems to indicate 
a certain degree of complacency or 
complicity from those in political of­
fice. No one in elected public office 
came forward prepared to accept 
responsibility for the continuation of 
extensive corruption, despite collec­
tively having "responsibility" for the
administration of public affairs within 
the state government’s powers.
Beyond the issue of personal cor­
ruption, this factor emphasises the 
basic asymmetry of responsibility in 
Westminster-style parliamentary sys­
tems. In theory, responsibility is borne 
individually by the respective mini­
ster and collectively by cabinet. In 
practice, actual responsibility is trans­
ferred to branch level officers. These 
career administrators find respon­
sibility thrust upon them and, unlike 
politicians, have no avenues of retreat 
or alternative substitutes. The recog­
nition of this asymmetry in 1988 was 
one of the factors behind the police
force’s widespread and, on a number 
of occasions, publicly declared loss of 
confidence in the Deputy Premier and 
Minister of Police Bill Gunn.
The high-level political manoeuvr­
ing surrounding the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
exposed this asymmetrical respon­
sibility. Politicians accused of com­
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plicity in corruption possessed far 
greater capacity to evade their respon­
sibility than did serving officers. 
Some police were dismissed, charged, 
stood down, forfeited their superan­
nuation, or were sacked by parlia­
ment; the politicians, however, 
emerged personally unscathed or were 
allowed a graceful resignation on full 
entitlements. Only their party’s im­
mediate electoral stocks were af­
fected, and this damage was reparable. 
Thus, although the government lost 
the by-election in the marginal seat of 
Merthyr in May, surveys showed that 
the electors (unlike the candidates) no 
longer ranked corruption as the main
issue affecting their vote.
Career public servants in conten­
tious or corruption-prone areas were 
placed in an invidious position. Some 
became personally corrupt and, like 
many in the Licencing Branch, chose 
to profit from their opportunities. But 
others more problematically were
caught up in a wider set of structural 
problem s. They adm inistered 
"problem" policy areas, were often re­
quired to interpret, formulate and im­
plement policy arising from their 
experience on the ground, were often 
pressed to accept "least worst" policy 
compromises, and found it necessary 
to separate moral questions from com­
mercial or enforcement ones. Such 
policy discretion would typically as­
sume a level of "corruption" without 
necessarily involving individual of­
ficers engaged in personally corrupt 
practices.
The difficulties of this position be-
Queenslanders adopted a 
self-righteousness typical of 
insular and hypocritical 
political cultures
came exacerbated if the government 
was publicly reluctant to help resolve 
such issues or was evasive over its for­
mal responsibility. The Queensland 
government’s public assertion that 
prostitution did not exist in Brisbane 
epitomises such an approach. The 
position was made even more in­
vidious when those administering 
policy suspected higher-up participa­
tion in covering up corruption, giving 
tacit consent to known illegal prac­
tices, or in unofficially condoning the 
"least worst" policy responses to field 
officers. In many appearances before 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry, police main­
tained that government ministers 
knew of and condoned policies of con­
tainment towards prostitution and as­
sociated criminal activities. Yet, 
because of their positions, these mini­
sters were able to deny formal 
knowledge of containment policies 
and thus evade responsibility.
This imbalance of responsibility 
and the issue of policing difficult 
policy areas have been aired but not 
constructively debated in the public 
arena. The complexity of issues in­
volving decision-making discretion, 
organisational histories, sub-cultural
administrative behaviour and struc­
tural "corruption", has been sub­
merged in the lengthy processes of 
investigation and reporting. During 
the term of the inquiry the more fun­
damental issues became collapsed 
into a hunt for a few guilty men, a 
crusade for scapegoats who could ac­
cept the blame personally and so min­
imise disruption to the system. 
Consequently, the seriousness of the 
issues at stake has barely surfaced on 
the public agenda.
Thus was the investigative process 
gradually translated into a series of 
dramas around the recollections of in­
dividual witnesses. Media reporting 
focussed on personality clashes, in­
dividual credibility, key dialogues be­
tween counsel and witnesses, and on 
allegations relating to other prominent 
personalities. Com m issioner 
Fitzgerald became the steely inter­
rogator, determined and purposeful. 
The counsel assisting the inquiry ap­
peared as the tenacious Doug 
"Bulldog" Drummond. Commissioner 
Terry Lewis was represented as suf­
fering from misplaced naivete and in­
competence, although his diaries 
suggested that he was not quite as 
naive as the public were given to 
believe. The "bagman", Jack Herbert, 
was depicted as wily and calculating: 
Russ Hinze as a populist "stirrer" who 
could talk his way around anything, 
and Joh Bjelke-Petersen as the ar­
chetypal Queensland politician, some­
what bumbling but cunning and 
evasive.
In some ways the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
came full circle. Established with 
limited expectations, it developed into 
a major investigative exercise in 
Q ueensland’s political history. 
Fitzgerald was popularly regarded to 
be among the most powerful men in 
Queensland. The Fitzgerald Commis­
sion emerged as a special type of 
government-established inquiry. It 
broke out of the conventional con­
straints that limit or marginalise the 
typical inquiry, and pursued investiga­
tive directions far beyond those initial­
ly envisaged.
Despite the claims of immediate
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success, the Fitzgerald Inquiry shows, 
above all else, that the political system 
is not working. After all, the inquiry 
was an ‘accident’ which went awry for 
the government: it was not part of the 
regular process of accountability. The 
fact that this inquiry not only un­
covered extensive evidence of corrup­
tion and misuse of public office, but 
also found it to span over three 
decades, is sufficient proof that 
mechanisms of accountability are in­
effective. In Queensland politics, 
commissions of inquiry serve merely 
to close previous chapters of corrup­
tion rather than provide a structural as­
sault on the enduring practices of 
corruption in public office.
What, then, is to be done? One 
response with considerable support in 
Queensland calls for a change of 
government. It is often suggested that 
a Labor government or even a 
balanced coalition would disassemble 
the persistent networks of corruption. 
However, a change of government 
may not guarantee a renaissance in
public administration. Despite good 
intendons, the pressures of governing 
a state with entrenched networks of 
corruption would inevitably com­
promise ideals. Moreover, other 
Labor governments in Australian 
states have shown, even in recent 
years, that they do not have what it 
takes. Over the last two decades Labor 
governments in Western Australia, 
New South Wales, and even South 
A ustralia provide examples of 
Labor’s accommodation to corruption 
when in office. Crime syndicates in 
Queensland have allegedly already 
made sizeable campaign donations to 
the Labor Party, as they have over the 
years to the Nationals. A change of 
government, a return to coalition, 
changes in cabinet, or even a change 
of leader may have effects at the mar­
gins, but none of itself is sufficient to 
engineer the changes necessary to en­
sure the containment of personal and 
systemic corruption.
In Queensland history the electoral 
defeat of a government has tended to
produce the continuation of a similar 
style of government under a different 
party label. The defeat of the Labor 
government in 1957 brought a change 
of party in government rather than a 
change of government. Both political 
parties in government before and after 
1957 eschewed public accountability 
largely as a tactic to preserve their 
political regimes of patronage. The 
Country Party/Nationals continued 
government in the style adapted by 
Labor throughout its years of domina­
tion of Queensland politics. Unlike 
the 1950s, today’s politicians are less 
rough and tumble, more smooth and 
technocratic, but their capacity to 
evade public accountability, misuse 
public office, or turn a blind eye to 
corruption has remained largely un­
changed.
JOHN WANNA teaches in the 
Division of Commerce and Ad* 
ministration at Griffith University, 
Queensland.
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